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Introduction 
In recent years, economists have expended considerable effort to make the notion of “utility” 
or “well-being” operational. The happiness literature (see Frey and Stutzer (2002) for a 
review) has related factors ranging from economic growth to religious beliefs to happiness in 
life. By contrast, scholars interested in the political economy of democracy still tend to 
compare countries on the basis of more or less objective indicators of the degree of 
democracy. But quite obviously even countries that achieve exactly the same democracy 
ranking in, say, the Freedom House index, will not offer the same degree of satisfaction with 
the way democracy works to their citizens. Much as we want to know what drives subjective 
perceptions of personal happiness in life, scholars and policymakers should be interested in 
what drives subjective perceptions of satisfaction with democracy (SWD). From a 
philosophical point of view, it would be paradoxical, to say the least, to try to build 
democratic polities in a way that fits with theory (the liberal democratic paradigm shaped by 
Western political thinkers since the 17
th century) but not with the people’s will. 
 
A number of recent papers have focused on SWD and its determinants. We will review some 
of them in more detail below. The literature suffers from three problems: SWD is 
conceptualized too easily; certain factors, in particular informal rules of the game in a society 
have not been considered as determinants of SWD; and the interaction of individual-level 
factors and society-level institutions has not been interpreted appropriately in quantitative 
terms. In this paper, we set out to deal with the second and third problem, while we mainly 
leave it to other papers to explore theoretical problems with the concept of SWD (Canache, 
Mondak et al. 2001). We will also have a little bit to say about the theoretical concept of 
SWD, but the character of the paper is strictly empirical. 
 
We quantify the impact of institutions and individual variables on satisfaction with 
democracy as it is measured by Euro-Barometers, cross-national surveys in Western Europe. 
Our main findings are the following: We reexamine the existing evidence for consensus 
versus majoritarian systems in depth and find considerable differences for different types of 
citizens. The resulting quantitative implications appear to have been overlooked so far. The 
interaction of institutional and individual variables comes out as quite important for policy 
decisions. Second, we provide what we believe to be the first analysis of the role of informal 
institutions in determining SWD. We find that corporatism together with a low degree of   3
income inequality is good for satisfaction with democracy, as is social capital (as measured 
by group memberships).  By contrast, the evidence for the effect of trust and for the rule of 
law on satisfaction is mixed.  
 
These results lead us to conclusions about the nature of people’s expectations toward 
democracy.  On the one hand, the path toward the liberal democratic ideal is acclaimed by 
Europeans, who almost systematically support any move toward it.  On the other hand, there 
is not “one best way” along this path, as the ‘meaning’ of democracy and expectations toward 
democratic regimes may vary significantly between countries. 
 
Section 2  derives the hypotheses.  Section 3 describes how we test the hypotheses and 
discusses methodological issues.  Section 4 presents the main quantitative findings for a few 
particularly interesting specifications, and Section 5 concludes.   
   
Theoretical background 
 
David Easton’s (1965; 1975) studies have served as a seminal work for the understanding of 
political support.  Easton was the first to make the distinction between objects of political 
support and types of political support.  Norris (1999) recently extended Easton’s three-level 
analysis of these ‘objects’ into five: support for the political community, regime principles, 
regime performance, regime institutions, and political actors.1  Empirical studies found 
evidence that the public actually makes clear distinction between these levels. 
 
We are interested in having a measure for the felt discrepancy between democratic norms and 
the actual democratic process, and it seems that the SWD item in the Eurobarometer and 
other surveys is the closest we can get to a measure for this at the moment (Thomassen 1995). 
It measures the support for the “constitution in operation” (Klingemann and Fuchs 1995). 
Still, it is problematic that scholars do not offer more in-depth discussion of what the 
“constitution in operation” can mean in citizens’ minds, nor of the extent to which the 
indicator measures the same thing across countries.  Indeed, the key point to keep in mind 
about this indicator is the absence of an objective and/or clearly identified reference object.  
Unlike for the other “objects,” people differ not only in the way they evaluate it, but also on 
                                                 
1 The typology runs from the most diffuse to the most specific support.   4
what they evaluate.  People differ with respect to what they have in mind when they think of 
democracy.  
 
Given these difficulties, it is not surprising that critical observers (Canache, Mondak et al. 
2001) have found that what “satisfaction with democracy” measures is neither the support for 
the idea of democracy (regime principles), nor the confidence in political institutions (regime 
institutions), nor the support for incumbents (political actors; see Merkl (1988) and Dalton 
(1999)), nor purely system support (Harmel and Robertson 1986; McDonough, Barnes et al. 
1986; Weil 1989; Fuchs 1993; Lockerbie 1993; Fuchs, Guidorossi et al. 1995; Morlino and 
Tarchi 1996; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Klingemann 1999).   
 
The bottom line is that in a sense, we are in a situation similar to other areas of (economic) 
policymaking, for example in environmental policy where we sometimes need to rely on 
contingent valuation, i.e. survey methods to calculate environmental benefits: Is some number 
better than no number? This paper cannot resolve this controversy. Some argue that the 
answer to this question is “no.” Canache et al. (2001) suggest that researchers stop using the 
SWD item of the Eurobarometers altogether because it is not clear what it measures.  
 
By contrast, we take the pragmatic view that the SWD item can act as a summary indicator 
(Clarke, Dutt et al. 1993). Although it contains some ambiguity, that ambiguity is acceptable. 
Nevertheless, we expect that “satisfaction with democracy” cannot but be extremely hard to 
predict, since it is driven by individual interpretation on both sides of the “discrepancy”: what 
democracy should look like, and the way it works.  We do not aim to distinguish the different 
channels2. What the approach does tell us is that in addition to pragmatically controlling for 
individual level variables in our regressions, we also need to interpret their interaction with 
the institutional variables in a clearer fashion than done so far in the literature (see below). 
 
Hypotheses, data, and methodology 
Hypotheses 
Having accepted the SWD item as the most operational variable for support for the 
constitution in operation, we can ask: What factors do we expect to play a role? Different 
                                                 
2 This would be very difficult or indeed just as impossible as deciphering whether a measured increased risk 
appetite of investors stems from a decrease in risk, a change in the way people perceive risk, or a decreased risk 
aversion.    5
scholars have emphasized different factors at different times: democratic history and political 
culture (Almond and Verba 1965; Inglehart 1997), formal democratic institutions (Lijphart 
1994; Anderson 1998; Lijphart 1999; Bowler and Donovan 2002), political and economic 
performance (Lipset 1994; Anderson and Guillory 1997).  We use a very simple theoretical 
logic to predict signs of our explanatory variables: 
 
First, the worse off an individual is in terms of economic well-being and political influence 
the less satisfied he will be with the way democracy works in his country. This is almost self-
evident and does not need much further theoretical explanation; for recent evidence on the 
role of winning and losing in elections see Anderson and LoTempio (2002). As a proxy for 
the position of an political-economic position of an individual in society, we use 
NATIONAL, the perception of change in national economic performance in the past 12 
months, PERSONAL, the perception of change in personal economic performance in the past 
12 months, and LOSER, a dummy variable which indicates whether the person had not voted 
for one of the parties which is now in the federal government. In addition, we also use a 
vector of demographic variables to control for GENDER (sometimes), INTEREST (interest 
in politics), INCOME, AGE, and EDUCATION.  
 
As a source for the demographic and economic variables, we use a series of Eurobarometers. 
Although the results remain robust across several years (see the section on robustness tests for 
more on this), in the tables presented in this paper, we focus on purpose on the panel for fall 
1990 (11 countries, about 1000 potential observations each). There are two reasons to do this. 
First, it allows us to directly compare and contrast our findings with those of Anderson and 
Guillory (1997). Second, the observations of many of the institutional variables (like 
corporatism and trust) come from this period. 
 
Second, we hypothesize that institutions that promote the amount and quality of political 
participation increase SWD. For formal institutions, this idea has been discussed and tested in 
the literature. The argument is that institutions like consensual democracy – which is 
measured mostly with respect to the election system, a formal institution - allow even those 
who voted for parties other than the government parties to be represented by the system. 
Already Lijphart (1994) makes the point that consensual democracies outperform 
majoritarian democracies in terms of responsiveness and do at least as well in terms of 
efficiency, and thus lead to higher levels of satisfaction with democracy. To test the role the   6
consensuality of the system plays for different individuals, we present a specification that 
closely follows the ideas of Anderson and Guillory (1997): Losers should be less satisfied, 
but the higher the consensus orientation of a system is, the better losers are off. Winners, on 
the contrary, prefer a majoritorian system. This hypothesis can be tested by including an 
interaction term LOSER*CONSENSUS in a regression3.   
We thus estimate 
i i i
i i i
i i i i i i
LOSER CONSENSUS CONSENSUS
LOSER PERSONAL NATIONAL
INTEREST AGE EDUCATION INCOME GENDER SWD
*                     
                    
2 1
3 2 1
5 4 3 2 1
δ δ
γ γ γ
β β β β β α
+ +
+ + + +
+ + + + + =
(1) 
where CONSENSUS has an index i, but varies only across individuals in different countries. 
To be consistent with our hyptoheses, we expect  0 2 > β ,  0 3 > β ,  0 1 > γ ,  0 2 > γ ,  0 3 < γ , 
0 1 > δ ,  0 2 > δ , while the other variables are pure control variables without any particular 
“story” associated with them. 
 
The specification as such is not new. Our contribution here lies less with the estimation of this 
equation as such, but rather with the evaluation of different scenarios. It is surprising that 
most of the literature omits either individual or institutional variables completely. Even when 
both are included in estimations, studies typically do not analyze how the impact of certain 
institutions is in the presence of individual factors. For example, it is true that Anderson and 
Guillory (1997) find that the “satisfaction gap” between winners and losers of elections 
decreases along the majoritarian/consensual axis created by Lijphart (1994). But they give no 
quantitative interpretation of which conclusions hold for which parts of the population. 
 
To our knowledge, there no study so far has considered the effect of institutional variables 
other than the consensus/majoritorian system. This is quite surprising, since there exists a 
wide variety of institutional and social indices which can be hypothesized to be related to 
system support. We take institutions to broadly mean “rules of the game in a society.”   
Informal rules trust and social capital are supposed to favor satisfaction with democracy 
                                                 
3 An alternative way is to run the model separately for losers and winners. The advantage of this is that one can 
allow for different coefficients on the other variables. Our experiments with this approach and evaluations with 
Clarify, the program provided by King et al. (2000), indicate that the quantitative results for the institutional 
variables and our main findings for the different effects on different types of people do not change. We therefore 
do not present them here.   7
because they allow conflicts to be solved more fairly and efficiently (for an application of this 
idea in a different context see Schneider and Wagner (2001)). 
 
In the present paper, we present and evaluate the results for a few particular specifications:  
First we introduce an indicator of corporatism (social partnership). The social partnership 
index is the corporatism index of Tarantelli (1986), where corporatism is defined as a system 
of societal structure which typically has a high degree of centralization in wage bargaining, a 
high consensus orientation, and an active role of the government in mediating social conflicts 
(each of these three elements is evaluated on a scale of 4 to 5. The total score is the sum of 
the three elements and therefore ranges from 0 to 15)4. This is the most formal of alternative 
institutions we consider. 
 
In variants of this model, besides social partnership, we also consider the effects for trust and 
group membership (both from Knack and Keefer (1997)), the gini index (i.e. the index of 
income inequality from Deininger and Squire (1996), a factor that is often categorized as 
being of institutional character because it contains a strong signal about value judgements in a 
society), and the degree of the rule of law (from Wagner (2000) who describes the primary 
sources).  
 
When we add these institutions to equation (1) above, we expect their coefficients to reflect 
that more corporatism, greater trust, more widespread group membership, lower inequality, 
and a better rule of law promote SWD. 
 
Estimation technique and interpretation of the results 
There are a number of issues related to the choice of estimation technique and the 
interpretation of the results in order to get the most out of the available data. For the main part 
of the paper, our dependent variable is a binary variable “Satisfaction” which is 1 when the 
respondent answered “Very satisfied” or “satisfied” to the question “How satisfied are you 
with the way democracy works in your country?” It is 0 if the respondent said “Not satisfied” 
                                                 
4 For some regressions not further explored in this paper but shown in table 1 as regressions (3) and (4), we also 
use an interaction term with LOSER for corporatism, on the same grounds as for consensus. Here, we have also 
tried a centered interaction term, but the results were not suggestive of any additional insight one might gain 
from this.   8
or “Not at all satisfied”. We use a probit estimation procedure, implemented via maximum 
likelihood, to estimate the above equation5.   
 
A technical issue also concerns the proper dealing with the panel data setup. In particular, 
country fixed effects may play an important role. Including institutional variables, which by 
definition don’t vary within a country without further controls may lead to spurious results 
since this way one might just pick up some other fixed effect but not the effect one wishes to 
examine. We have explored several possibilities to deal with this issue. We use two 
complementary approaches here, which shed light on the questions we are interested in.  
 
First, we run regressions controlling only for the individual level variables for each country 
separately. We then do simulations (see below for an explanation) and plot predicted 
probabilities of being satisfied against various institutional variables.  
 
Second, we only consider all observations in one panel but include institutions of interest and 
a dummy variable for Italy which is clearly the (negative) outlier in terms of satisfaction with 
democracy (depending on which observations are included, approximately 25-35% of the 
people as opposed to more than 50-60% in other countries). This allows us to control for the 
strongest country effect we detected. The advantage of this approach, while not completely 
immune to the problem just discussed, is that we have actual parameter estimates which can 
again be used in simulations to make more substantive claims than through the analysis of the 
first approach. The section on robustness tests reports what we have done to further explore 
the validity of the results.  
 
Through stacking all observations together and running a probit model over the whole 
sample, we recognize that there may be other potential problems (bias, wrong standard errors 
if the coefficients vary across individuals and countries, ignorance of the different sample 
sizes due to deleted observations). An alternative is to specify a TS-CS-binary model (where 
the “time” dimension here corresponds to the individuals). The results obtained with the 
                                                 
5 As almost always, experiments with logit estimation reveal that the quantitative interpretations do not change. 
Since the original data is in ordered categorical format (4 categories), we have also explored what happens when 
we use an ordered probit model. For space reasons – and because the results did not allow us any particular 
additional insight – we decided to present our findings from the binary probit in the main part of the paper. 
However, we do include a few figures based on the ordered probit without further comments in the appendix to 
give the reader a taste of the results in this model.   9
STATA package suggest that neither the size of the coefficients nor the standard errors are 
markedly different from the ones we get in our procedure.  
 
Finally, we break with the tradition of reporting only quite unintuitive “probit coefficients.” 
While we have included a summary table containing “raw” estimation results, we find that a 
better way to understand the implications of our models and the uncertainty of the results is 
through statistical simulation. In particular, the usual statement about the statistical 
significance of certain factors leaves the highly policy-relevant question of the quantitative 
importance (i.e. the substantive significane) of the effects unanswered. We follow King et al. 




We focus on what we believe are new findings. We start by exploring graphically the 
relationship between various institutions and SWD (section 4.2). The analysis in section 4.3 
focuses exclusively on consensus since it is this formal institution that has received most 
attention in this context. After that, we turn to quantitative results for more informal 
institutions and find that many of them have been unjustly ignored so far. 
 
A first cut at the role of institutions 
Consider first the results from probit regressions on the individual level variables (here 
omitting gender because it is never significant; for space reasons we do not report this 
regression here but note that personal and national economic performance come out to be the 
most significant and important factors). As described in the methodological section and in the 
appendix, we then do simulations and obtain predicted values for the probability of 
satisfaction. In the graphs below we plot these predictions against an array of institutional 
variables. The lines indicate the 95% confidence interval. From these pictures, it seems to be 
the case that corporatism and income inequality are relatively good predictors for satisfaction 
with democracy. For trust and the rule of law, the evidence seems to be less clear and as we 
emphasize later, this suspicion turns out to be correct since the effect of these two variables 
comes out as sometimes positive and sometimes negative, depending on the specification. For 
consensus, there seems to be a somewhat positive effect. However, here we can most clearly 
see that Italy is an outlier with respect to its citizens’ level of satisfaction with democracy.     10
 
Figure 1: Probability of satisfaction and institutional variables (all individual level 
variables held at their median; results based on 10,000 simulations. Standard 
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While these pictures allow us some first insights, we need to make the analysis more 
statistically rigorous by including the institutional variables of interest into the regressions. 
Table 1 contains several specifications. First note that also with controlling for institutional 
variables, we find that the effects of the individual level variables go in the expected 
direction: Losers are generally less satisfied; those who evaluate the national economic 
performance positively are more satisfied as are those that judge the development of their 
personal economic situation positively; wealthier individuals are also more satisfied. These 
three effects also dominate in quantitative terms. We cannot find robust statistical evidence 
for political interest, education or age being relevant for SWD, although several equations 
appear to suggest that more educated citizens tend to be less satisfied and that older people 
tend to be more satisfied. This allows speculations about the dual character of SWD we 
mentioned above, namely that SWD is the outcome of both individual expectations towards 
democracy (which may be higher for more educated individuals and lower for people who 
have experienced democracy longer) and individual perceptions of the performance of 
democracy (which may be more critical for more educated individuals and more positive for 
older people).  Likelihood ratio tests confirm that leaving out all institutional variables does 
worse than including some combination of them. The hypothesis that the restricted model is 
indistinguishable from the unrestricted one (the latter being created by adding one or more 
institutional variables) is rejected for each institution considered here at the highest 
confidence levels6. 
                                                 
6 The overall fit of the different specifications can be evaluated by comparing predicted and actual values. See 
the appendix.   12
 
Table 1: Binary probit estimation (Dependent variable: 1= satisfied or very satisfied, 0 = 
not satisfied or not at all satisfied) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
Loser  -0.377 -0.358 -0.578 -0.588 -0.342 -0.386 -0.406  -0.365 
 (11.00)*
* 























Personal Economic   0.141  0.124 0.144 0.132 0.144 0.145 0.131  0.127 
Performance  (7.44)** (6.04)** (7.57)** (6.88)** (7.18)** (7.67)** (6.87)**  (6.31)** 
Political  Interest  -0.018 -0.005 -0.030 -0.023 -0.013 -0.013 -0.016  -0.017 
  (1.00) (0.23) (1.63) (1.27) (0.69) (0.71) (0.88)  (0.86) 
Income  0.017 0.020 0.017 0.022 0.013 0.015 0.025  0.019 
  (3.40)** (3.47)** (3.24)** (4.26)**  (2.31)* (2.95)**  (4.88)**  (3.28)** 
Education  -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006  -0.004 
 (1.08)  (1.79)  (2.04)*  (2.35)*  (1.05) (1.50) (1.96)  (1.01) 
Age  0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002  0.001 
  (1.84) (0.55) (1.43) (1.49) (1.48) (1.66) (1.80)  (1.31) 
Corporatism  - 0.023  0.035  0.013 -  -  -  0.023 
   (3.04)**  (3.93)**  (1.26)        (1.90) 
Loser*Corporatism  -  - 0.024  0.024 -  -  -  - 
     (2.19)*  (2.19)*        
Gini  (Inequality)  - -0.026 - -0.025 -  - -0.037  -0.047 
   (4.55)**  (5.23)**    (9.48)** (6.31)** 
Attitude  towards)  - 0.212 -  -  -  -  -  - 
change(gradual=hig
h 
  (6.03)**         
Trust  - -0.005 -  -  -  -  -  -0.027 
   (2.28)*           (4.94)** 
Consensus  0.057  - - - - - -  - 
  (1.78)          
Loser*Consens  0.152  - - - - - -  - 
  (3.74)**          
Groups  - - - -  0.171  - -  1.153 
       (2.31)*    (4.88)** 
Rule  of  law  - - - - -  0.089  -  -0.157 
        (5.83)**   (4.83)** 

















Constant  -0.581 -0.195 -0.812 0.151 -0.747 -1.428 0.513  2.302 
  (4.42)** (0.77) (6.44)** (0.68) (5.96)** (9.08)** (2.89)**  (5.60)** 
Observations  6742 5862 6742 6742 6141 6742 6742  6141 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level             
 
Notes: 1. The long regression with all country dummies but without a constant is omitted for space reasons. 
Most dummies are generally significant (exceptions are Denmark, Germany, Portugal, and Great Britain) and 
take on a value around –0.5 up to –0.7. Italy clearly is an outlier with a value of –1.7. Similarly, the by country 
regressions used to create the graphs in section 4.2 are omitted. 
2. Gender was only included in the first regression, since it turned out to be quite insignificant (coefficient 
0.02, s.e. 0.03). 
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Quantitative results for consensus 
A problem in the existing literature is that scholars have typically stopped short of making 
statements about the relative importance of different factors influencing SWD. Knowing that 
variable X has a statistically significant impact on SWD does not help the policymaker judge 
whether it is worth to change X, if there is no statement about the relative size of the effect. 
Scenario analysis can help bring some light to this question. 
 
Consider first the impact of consensual systems on the satisfaction of the “median citizen”. 
Since we have argued that losers will benefit more from such a system, we present the results 
separately for male median winners and losers (the results are virtually the same for women). 
 
Figure 2: Minimum and maximum consensus and satisfaction for male median losers 
and median winners (smooth histogram from 10,000 simulations based on parameter 




As can be seen from the figure, a loser who is at the median in terms of age, education, 
income and his/her perception of national and personal economic performance is expected to 
gain roughly 20-30 percentage points of probability of being satisfied. The figure also clearly 
indicates that losers gain more from a consensus system than winners (we show the results for 
a change from the minimum value of consensus in the sample (Great Britain) to the maximum 
value (Netherlands)). In fact, for winners there is a relatively big uncertainty as to which way 
the effect will go. This can be seen from the overlap of the two kernel plots.  
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Having established that consensus is not unambiguously good for SWD overall, we want to 
add to the literature by documenting more in depth the quite substantial interaction between 
individual and institutional variables. For this purpose, we consider four scenarios, shown in 
the next figure7.  
 
For example, the best-off female loser (i.e. a woman ranking highest on all individual level 
characteristics, shown in the top left panel) has a high probability of being satisfied under 
both systems. While the point estimates suggest that a change from a majoritarian to a 
consensus system may bring a substantial gain (up to 20 percentage points here, leading to a 
probability of being satisfied of 90% instead of 70%) with it, there is a considerable amount 
of uncertainty associated with such a change, which is again indicated by the overlap of the 
kernel plots. 
 
We find it interesting to consider an extreme case like the one in the lower left corner. 
Making losers better off economically and in terms of education (which would bring them 
approximately two thirds of the way from the solid kernel plot to the dashed one (not shown)) 
and having a more consensual system clearly improves satisfaction with democracy. The 
second effect is highlighted separately in the lower right panel.  
 
By contrast, and plausibly, a person with a strong position in society in terms of education 
and income who belongs to the group of winners rather prefers a majoritarian type of system, 
which gives him 90% of SWD as opposed to 76%, although there is again some overlap 
between the distributions (top right panel). 
 
                                                 
7 Note that while we report results for women and men, since the gender variable is never significant, this does 
not amount to much. We just wanted to construct concrete and maybe not unrealistic scenarios.   15
Figure 3:   Minimum and maximum consensus and satisfaction for four different 
types of people (smooth histogram from 10,000 simulations based on parameter 





Results for informal rules of the “society game” 
The second contribution of this paper is that we consider for the first time systematically – at 
least to our knowledge – institutional variables other than consensus and their interaction with 
individual level variables. The “raw” estimation results in table 1 (columns (2) and (8)) 
suggest that the institutional variables in general have a significant effect on SWD, although 
there are some surprises (like the strongly negative coefficient for trust). Again, simulation is 
the method we use to get more interesting and interpretable results. All the results presented 
in table 2 and discussed in the following are based on regression (8) in table 1, unless 
otherwise stated. 
 
Table 2 is quite self-explanatory. To understand how to read it, first select a “rule of the 
game” of interest. For example, let us consider inequality. Then select one of the three 
scenarios in the three columns. For example, take the loser who perceives national economic   16
performance to be very bad and has all other control variables at their median (column 1). 
Then, the table tells us that at the median of inequality in the sample, the probability of being 
satisfied is 48%, with a 95% confidence interval between 44% and 52%. By contrast, if 
inequality is lower, for example only in the first quartile (25%-Percentile), the probability of 
being satisfied goes up to 58%. From the minimum to maximum inequality, SWD decreases 
by 20%. Thus, inequality is strongly regarded as being incompatible with the idea that most 
people have of democracy in Europe. For both winners and losers, at all levels of personal 
and economic performance, inequality substantially decreases satisfaction with democracy 
(cf. the findings of Alesina (2001) who reports a relatively high degree of caring for the issue 
of inequality among Europeans).  
 
Secondly, corporatism turns out to be a reliable but not so strong predictor of satisfaction with 
democracy as well. For example, ceteris paribus, a maximal increase of the degree of 
corporatism (which amounts to quite a system change) increases satisfaction for losers by 
10% on average, whereas winners only gain 5%. The effects of corporatism and inequality 
are even stronger when one takes into account that typically the two variables move in 
opposite directions (see also the simple correlations in the appendix). The kernel plot in the 
following figure shows just that.  
 
Figure 4:   Inequality and corporatism (minimum and maximum values) and 
satisfaction for the median citizen (smooth histogram from 10,000 simulations based on 
parameter estimates in regression (2) in table 1). 
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Table 2:  Predicted probabilities of satisfaction with democracy and first 
differences (FD) under different scenarios (10,000 simulations based on regression (8) in 
table 1;  95% confidence intervals in parentheses) 











    All other variables at their medians 
Corporatism 
Low 
25%-Percentile  .46 
( .41    .51) 
.64 
(.60    .68) 
.77 
(.73    .80) 
 Median  .48 
(.44    .52) 
.66 
( .63    .69) 
.78 
(.75    .81) 
High 75%-Percentile  .51 
( .47    .54) 
.68 
(.66     .71) 
.80 
(.78    .82) 
  FD Min to Max  .09 
( -.01    .19) 
.08 
(-.01    .17) 
.06 
(.008    .13) 
Rule of law 
Low 
25%-Percentile  .52 
(.48    .56) 
.72 
(.69    .75) 
.81 
(.78    .83) 
 Median  .48 
(.44    .52) 
.69 
(.66     .71) 
.78 
(.75    .81) 
High 75%-Percentile  .42 
(.36    .47) 
.63 
(.60    .65) 
.76 
(.73    .79) 
  FD Min to Max  -.14 
( -.20   -.08) 
-.12 
(-.17   -.07) 
-.08 
( -.12   -.04) 
Group 
membership 
25%-Percentile  .32 
(.28    .37) 
.53 
(.48    .59) 
.64 
(.60    .69) 
 Median  .48 
( .44    .52) 
.69 
(.66     .71) 
.78 
(.75    .81) 
High 75%-Percentile  .53 
( .48     .59) 
.73 
(.70    .76) 
.82 
(.78    .85) 
  FD Min to Max  .31 
(.19    .42) 
.28 
(.17    .39) 
.24 
(.15    .32) 
Inequality 
Low 
25%-Percentile  .58 
(.52, .64) 
.75 
(.70    .79) 
.85 
(.81    .88) 
 Median  .48 
(.44    .52) 
.66 
(.63    .69) 
.78 
(.75    .81) 
High 75%-Percentile  .43 
(.40     .47) 
.62 
(.59    .64) 
.75 
( .72    .77) 
  FD Min to Max  -.20 
( -.26    -.14) 
-.18 
( -.22    -.13) 
-.14 
(-.18   -.10) 
Trust 
Low 
25%-Percentile  .57 
(.50    .63) 
.76 
( .72    .80) 
.84 
(.80    .88) 
 Median  .48 
(.44    .52) 
.69 
(.66     .71) 
.78 
(.75    .81) 
High 75%-Percentile  .37 
(.34    .41) 
.58 
(.54    .63) 
.69 
(.67    .72) 
  FD Min to Max  -.32 
(-.44   -.21) 
-.30 
(-.41   -.19) 
-.26 
(-.35   -.16) 
 
 
Third, in the regression shown here, trust is strongly negatively related to satisfaction with 
democracy. This is completely at odds with all predictions. However, we are quick to 
emphasize that this happens in this particular specification but not in others. We picked this 
one on purpose to show which effects are possible. It is very hard to explain why groups are   18
so positively (and robustly) related to satisfaction whereas trust is sometimes positive and 
sometimes negative. One lesson we draw from this exercise, however, is that taking 
individual level factors into account is crucial. Leaving them out of a regression gives a 
positive impact of trust always (as found by Anderson (1998)) – but this is a spurious 
correlation as we show here. A possible explanation for the ambiguous results for trust lies in 
its potential to increase rent-seeking in a society (Schneider and Wagner 2001).  
 
By contrast, the degree to which a society fosters group memberships of its members is 
almost always significantly related to satisfaction with democracy. Here, a jump from the 
25th percentile to the median boosts satisfaction of the loser with a dark perception of 
national economic performance by 15% points. Here we have a clear policy implication: 
fostering the degree to which people engage in social interactions improves their support of 
the regime per se. This is related to arguments of Putnam (1993). 
 
Finally, and equally surprisingly, the rule of law actually has a small but significant negative 
impact on satisfaction with democracy. The effect is stronger for losers (up to minus 12 
percentage points) than for winners (up to minus 8 percentage points). Again, however, we 
note that in alternative specifications other results arise. Table 1 reports a regression, for 
example, which gives a positive coefficient on the rule of law (regression (5)). The most we 
can say for this institution is that its effect on SWD is not clear.    19
Conclusion and policy implications 
 
A first major policy message is that, much as there exists no economic project that is truly 
Pareto-improving, there also exists virtually no policy to improve everybody’s satisfaction 
with democracy (SWD). A consensual system generally promotes satisfaction, but one needs 
to distinguish different types of citizens. Losers, poorer and less educated people gain in 
terms of satisfaction with democracy when a consensual system is present. Our findings lead 
us to reject the hypothesis that a consensus system is unambiguously better able to provide 
high degrees of satisfaction of the population than a majoritarian system. 
 
Second, we present evidence for the role other institutions and rules of the game in a society 
play for SWD. We find that corporatism and group membership as a measure of social capital 
are good for satisfaction. By contrast people who live in countries with a high degree of 
income inequality tend to be less satisfied. The findings for trust and the rule of law are 
ambiguous.  
 
We interpret the lack of unambiguous results for some institutions as corresponding to 
different expectations of citizens in different countries. Conversely, one should be careful in 
demanding, say “more corporatism” too fast. Thus, while our empirical results are interesting, 
they also point to a severe shortcoming in the theory of satisfaction with democracy. The 
theory that provides a convincing account of ideals of democracy as related to perceptions of 
its actual workings together with the two apparently most important dimensions of 
institutions, conflict management potential and efficiency, remains to be written. We regard 
this as the big challenge for future research.   20
Appendix 
Descriptive statistics and data sources 
 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Satisfaction with democracy  .613  .481  0  1 
Loser .556  .501  0  1 
National economic performance (NatEc)  2.760  1.038  1  5 
Personal economic performance (PerEc)  2.964  .947  1  5 
Interest in politics  2.416  .932  1  4 
Income (categorical)  6.831  3.544  1  12 
Years of education  17.215  5.138  6  98 
Age 45.210  16.994  15  99 
Sex 1.492  .50  1  2 
Attitude towards social change  2.206  .520  0  3 
Consens -.0920  .813  -1.56  1.08 
Loser*Consens -.065  .598  -1.56  1.08 
Trust 35.961  10.090  21.4  52.7 
Corporatism 7.808  3.240  4  14 
Loser*Corporatism 4.309  4.575  0  14 
Gini (Inquality)  30.472  4.412  24.34  37.67 
Rule of law  8.755  1.117  6.18  10 
  
Data used for the tables in the main part of the paper are generally from the Eurobarometer 34.2 
(1990). Data on corporatism (social partnership) is from Tarantelli (1986), data on trust from the 
World Values Surveys as reported by Knack and Keefer (1997), data on income inequality (GINI) 
from Deininger and Squire (1996), Consensus vs. majoritarian democracy from Lijphart (1994), the 
rule of law from Wagner (2001) who describes the primary source. Data on governments is from 
http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/00europa.htm. LOCORP=LOSER*CORPO. 
LOCON=LOSER*CONSENS. Most of the individual level variables are self-explanatory. Loser was 
defined as 1 if the person had not voted for a party that was in the government at the time of the 
survey. Attitude towards social change is 3 if the person prefers gradual change, and 1 if the person 
believes that “we need a revolution.” Higher income categories earn more. People with a value of 4 on 
interest with politics are very interested, those with a value of 1 are not interested at all. Both personal 
and national economic performance refer to the change over the past 12 months and have higher 
values if the person said her or his situation got “better”. Gender is coded such that 2=woman, 1=man. 
Gini is higher for more unequal countries. The rule of law index is higher in more orderly societies. 
 
Correlation between the institutional variables 
 
 Consens  Trust  Corporatism  Gini  Rule  of  law  Groups 
Consens 1.0000           
Trust 0.0711  1.0000         
Corp. 0.4283  0.3033  1.0000       
Gini -0.2734  -0.2136  -0.5501  1.0000     
Rulelaw 0.4424 0.3460  0.7207  -0.4038  1.0000   
Groups 0.3281  0.8187 0.3630  -0.0471  0.3780  1.0000   21
Overall fit of the models 
 
The figures shown here reveal that neither of the specifications is really superior to the others. 
All of them produce reasonable good overall fits, with no systematic over- or underprediction, 
but with a few outlier predictions every now and then. It is important to realize that these 
figures do not tell us, say, whether the consensus variable is more important or other 
institutional variables are.  
 
In the graphs, “Model A” refers to a specification with consensus as the institutional variable, 
whereas “Model B” is a specification with corporatism. 
 
Figure 5:  Goodness of fit in two specifications 
 
 
The predicted probabilities of satisfaction with democracy were sorted into 150 intervals by 
size. For each interval, the average probability of satisfaction is plotted on the y-axis against 
the average prediction on the x-axis. The closer the circles (which indicate the number of 
observations in that particular “bin”) are to the 45 degree line, the better the fit.  
   22
 Simulation technique 
Recall that the probit model can be expressed with two core equations (King 1998): 
(,) i Yf θ α =  and  (, ) i gX θ β =  where the first equation indicates that the dependent variable 
is drawn from  (,) f θ α , i.e. the stylized normal distribution in the present case.θ  represents 
the features that vary across observations (modeled here as a linear term  i X β ), while α  is a 
set of ancillary parameters (the threshold parameter τ  is set to zero for convenience). Now, 
consider the following procedure: First, specify a “scenario”, i.e. a vector of values for the 
explanatory variables that we are interested in. Second, draw m  sets of estimated parameters 
from the multivariate normal distribution, which takes as inputs the estimated coefficients 
from the regressions and their variance-covariance matrix. The multivariate normal 
distribution is appropriate since a Central Limit Theorem holds. Third, use these simulated 
parameters and the scenario vector to calculate m  values of  i X θ β = . Since for the present 
model, this also gives the expected value, these values can directly be used to learn something 
about mean predictions of satisfaction with democracy (including confidence intervals), first 
differences and other quantities of interest. An intuitive way of characterizing effects of 
institutions on democracy are so-called kernel plots, i.e. smoothed histograms based on many 
expected values. In that case, the vertical axis reports the frequency of a given predicted 
value8. All simulations and plots are based on 10,000 simulations. For all the simulations in 
section 4.3, we set the Italy dummy equal to zero. This means that the results should be 
interpreted as pertaining to all countries except Italy. Leaving out all observations for Italy in 
the first place does not affect the results. 
 
Robustness tests 
We have considered several robustness tests of our calculations. Most importantly, in many 
different specifications (for example, dropping one of the demographic variables at a time, 
adding additional variables like unemployment or actual GDP growth), the direction of the 
effects remains the same (including the ambiguity of results for trust and the rule of law). Of 
course, the magnitude of the effects is different. But the differences are small and thus do not 
warrant a further discussion here. We have also experimented with different Eurobarometer 
                                                 
8 We choose to report absolute frequencies because this seems to us to be a better way to think that we actually 
are interested in individuals’ satisfaction with democracy. These can easily be transformed into relative 
frequencies.   23
datasets. Unfortunately, not all the same questions were asked in the same Eurobarometers. 
The same items are available for only a few Eurobarometers. The substantive results remain 
robust when we use Eurobarometer 42 instead. Applying a logit instead of a probit setup does 
not change the substantive results. Including more country dummies in addition to Italy does 
not alter the qualitative results. Neither does leaving out all observations pertaining to Italy; 
the consensus variable gets a slightly stronger positive effect then, though. In quantitative 
terms, the effect of consensual systems are less pronounced for most types of individuals 
considered (except for the worst-off female). By contrast, the predicted first differences of 
changes in national economic performance evaluations and personal economic well-being are 
bigger by between 0.02 and 0.04 percentage points. Finally, the substantive conclusions are 
not altered when we consider an ordered probit model, as can be seen from the following 
figures. 
Figure 6: Minimum and maximum consensus and degree of satisfaction for four 
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